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THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
..............

r.w.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 10046.

DONALD GENE KAZDA,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
. 1,1

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant has appealed from his conviction of assaultwith intent to commit murder in violation of 76-30-14,
U.C.A. 1953, and robbery, in violation of 76-51-1, U.C.A.
1953, upon jury trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Duchesne County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was brought to trial on the charges from
which he now appeals after reversal of his previous conviction by this court. State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d
407 ( 1963). After jury trial, upon which a verdict of guilty
was returned, the appellant was committed to the Utah
State Penitentiary for the indeterminate terms provided by
law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that this court
should affirm the appellant's conviction on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of facts as
constituting the evidence of the case when viewed in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Ward, 10 U.2d
34,347 P.2d 865 ( 1959).
In the month of February, 1962, the defendant, along
with his brother, Dennis, and one Norma Rae Barker, left
Salmon, Idaho, travelling south into Utah (R. 8). They
arrived in Duchesne, Utah, on the evening of the 20th of
February, 1962, at approximately 7:00 P.M. (R. 9). Immediately after leaving Duchesne, the defendant made a
statement that he knew of a gas station and grocery store
which would be a good place to "hold up" (R. 10). Prior
to arriving at Bridgeland, Utah, the defendant took a shotgun from under the seat and a pistol was removed from the
glove box of the automobile ( R. 10) . The defendant, his
brother and Mrs. Barker stopped at the combined home,
grocery store and service station of Eldon Brady. According to the testimony of Norma Barker, the appellant and his
brother put stockings over their heads and entered the store,
with the appellant carrying the shotgun. Thereafter she
heard a blast and saw a flash. The appellant and his brother
returned to the car and the appellant was carrying the shotgun ( R. 13, 14) . Thereafter, the trio left and as they drove
away the appellant stated to Mrs. Barker that the money
he obtained was "not much to shoot an old man for" ( R.
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t·t). Subsequently, the shotgun was thrown out of the car as
was a wallet which was later identified as being that of
Eldon Brady ( R. 15) .
A short time later Sheriff George Marett and others observed Mr. Brady who had been shot in the forearm and the
breast by what would appear to be a shotgun (R. 26, 28).
Shotgun pellets were found in the area where Mr. Brady
was lying ( R. 26, 29) . Subsequently the shotgun was found
in the vicinity of Indian Canyon ( R. 35) and Mr. Brady's
billfold was found approximately one mile away (R. 46).
A special agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified that he interrogated the appellant in April,
1962, and that the appellant admitted being present at the
time of the shooting and the robbery, but contended that he
was in the back seat drunk ( R. 58) .
Sheriff Marett testified that he had endeavored to serve
a subpoena on one Johnnie Buck, who had previously testified at the prior trial, and that Johnnie Buck was in the
Nebraska State Penitentiary (R. 38-42), and not subject to
the jurisdiction of the State of Utah.
Subsequently, over objection, the trial court permitted
the testimony received at the previous hearing of Johnnie
Buck to be read to the jury. His testimony was to the effect
that the appellant, in his presence, had admitted to the
holdup at Bridgeland, Utah, and had stated that he had
shot an old man with a shotgun ( R. 64) . The appellant did
not testify, but his brother, Dennis, did testify and stated
that he, Dennis, did the shooting rather than the appellant,
and that his brother had been in the back seat of the motor
vehicle drunk at the time.
~Irs. Barker and Dennis Kazda, the brother of the appellant, admitted convictions for the same crime for which
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the appellant was being charged. Mrs. Barker stated she
had been convicted as an accessory ( R. 18) .
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a finding of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT CAN CLAIM NO ERROR BASED UPON
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO CONTINUE
HIS TRIAL PENDING DISPOSITION OF HIS PETITION
FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT COMPLAINING OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FAlLURE TO GRANT THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A
CHANGE OF VENUE.

The appellant in Point I of his brief contends that the
trial court erred in forcing him to go to trial after overruling his motion for a change of venue while there was pending before the Supreme Court a petition for an extraordinary writ to review the trial court's decision. At the outset
it should be observed that the appellant does not contend
that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a
change of venue. Indeed, he notes that it is within the
sound discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant
a motion for a change of venue. This court has on several
occasions so ruled. Winters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 278
Pac. 816 ( 1929); Chamblee v. Stocks, 9 U.2d 342,344 P.2d
980 ( 1959); Anderson v. johnson, 1 U.2d408, 268 P.2d427
( 1954); State v. Bunis, 388 P.2d 233 (Utah 1964). The
appellant's only contention is that the trial court committed
error in proceeding merely because there was a petition to
the Supreme Court to review the matter. It is submitted
that the appellant is in no position to complain. Since he
does not on appeal contend that there was an abuse of discretion in denying the change of venue, he cannot complain
because the trial court did not continue the matter pending
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a ruling from the Supreme Court. He could, had he so
desired, have sought review of the question of change of
\'Cnue by this appeal. Having failed to seek that remedy, in
the absence of a contention that the trial court was without
jurisdiction, the question of whether the court should or
should not have proceeded to trial is moot. There is no question but what the trial court had jurisdiction since there was
nothing pending before the Supreme Court but a mere petition for extraordinary writ. No writ had as yet issued nor
did the Supreme Court ever issue a writ. Until the Supreme
Court assumed jurisdiction of the case, the trial court was
within its discretion in proceeding to determine the issues.
In 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 499, p. 166, it is
stated:
"* * * A continuance asked by accused, on the magistrate's overruling his motion for a change of venue, to enable him to apply
for mandamus to compel the change, is properly refused, his remedy being by appeal."

See State v. Barnett, 98 So. Caro. 422, 82 S.E. 795.
It has been generally recognized that where the granting or a refusal of a motion for a change of venue is within
the discretion of the court, the ruling thereon cannot be
reviewed by mandamus. Only if the question of a change
of venue is ministerial can the remedy of mandamus lie.
Pace v. Wolfe, 76 Utah 368, 289 Pac. 1102 ( 1930).
Generally it is recognized that venue may not be reviewed by mandamus, prohibition or certiorari. 56 Am.
Jur., Venue, Sec. 75; Annotation 170 ALR 528. See also
Witkin, Extraordinary Writs in Criminal Practice, First
Criminal Law Seminar (Cohn 1961), where the author
observes that there is no need for extraordinary writs in
criminal cases in most instances where the appellate remedy
is readily available.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
It is clear from Utah law that a motion for a change
of venue, not based on irregular venue, lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. In these instances it has
usually been determined that certiorari or other extraordinary writ will not lie to review the court's discretion, since
( 1) appeal is available and the order is not as yet final,
State v. Goode, 4 Ida. 730,44 Pac. 640; or (2) that the
abuse of discretion must be so patent and obvious as to raise
no issue of fact. People v. District Court, 72 Colo. 525, 211
Pac. 626 ( 1922) . This court has recognized as much in
other cases since in Page v. Commercial National Bank of
Salt Lake City, 38 Utah 440, 112 Pac. 816, the court recognized that certiorari would not lie to review interlocutory
orders. Consequently, it is manifest that there is no merit
to the appellant's position; first, since the court was not
without jurisdiction merely by the filing of a petition for
extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court, and could, in its
discretion proceed; second, the remedy being sought by the
appellant was improper; and, third, appellant can claim
no prejudice since he does not in this case contend an abuse
of discretion based upon the failure to grant the change of
venue.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF JOHNNIE BUCK, GIVEN AT A
PRIOR HEARING, TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE AT
THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL WHERE THE WITNESS WAS
CONFINED IN PRISON OUT OF STATE.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed
error in receiving the testimony of Johnnie Buck given at
his previous trial. It is undisputed that Mr. Buck was not
within the State of Utah and in fact was confined in a Nebraska State Prison. Even so, the appellant contends that
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an effort should have been made to obtain the presence of
Johnnie Buck. The basis of the appellant's contention is
that 77-45-12, and 13, U.C.A. 1953, provide a means for
the obtaining of witnesses from out of state, and that an
effort should have been made to obtain the absent witness
by exercising the provisions of these statutes. The cited
statutes are the Utah version of the Uniform Act to Secure
the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in
Criminal Cases. The identical same argument raised by
the appellant in this case was raised in the case of State v.
Leggroan, Utah Supreme Court No. 10004, February 14,
1964. In that case the appellants contended that a primary
witness who resided in California should have been secured
pursuant to the Uniform Act prior to allowing the testimony of the witness given at preliminary hearing to be read
to the jury. This court rejected the argument, noting that
the Uniform Act ( 77-4 5-12 and 13 ) is permissive in tenor.
The court noted in rejecting the argument similar to that
raised by the appellant herein:
''Perhaps the obvious practical, jurisdictional and possible constitutional problems that might be raised, together with the permissive tenor of the Act, have led the courts, wherever the problem
has arisen, almost unanimously to conclude that the Act, as to
production of witnesses, may be helpful in a given case, permissive in nature, but not mandatory. We think such authorities reflect good reason and logic and we go along with them under the
facts of this particular case."

The court relied upon and cited with approval cases from
other jurisdictions where a similar ruling had been made.
People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35 ( 1942);
People v. Hunley, 313 Mich. 688, 21 N.W.2d 923 ( 1946);
State l'. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248,320 P.2d 446 ( 1958); People
z·. Day, 219 Cal. 562, 27 P.2d 909 ( 1933).
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Consequently, it is apparent that the appellant's argument is foreclosed and without merit. The trial court relied
upon the provisions of 77--44-3, U.C.A. 1953, providing the
jurisdictional prerequisites for the admissibility of the testimony of absent witnesses. State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260
P.2d 539 ( 1953). The trial court's reliance was properly
placed in view of this court's decision in State v. Leggroan,
supra. Consequently, there is no merit to the appellant's
position.
POINT III.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CORROBORATION OF THE
TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOMPLICE, NORMA BARKER,
TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT.

The appellant contends that there was insufficient corroborative evidence of the accomplice, Norma Barker, to
convict him in view of the provisions of 77-31-18, U.C.A.
1953, prohibiting the conviction of an accused upon the
testimony of an accomplice in the absence of some evidence
tending to independently corroborate his commission of the
cnme.
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 ( 1963),
this court recognized that evidence virtually identical with
that received in the instant case was more than sufficient to
corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Barker. The appellant
apparently relies for his argument upon the position that
the testimony of Johnnie Buck should not have been received in evidence. As can be seen from the argument made
in Point II of this brief, there is no merit to the appellant's
position, and the admissions made by the appellant to Mr.
Buck in and of themselves amply corroborate the testimony
of Mrs. Barker. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285
(1942) ;Statev. Vigil, 123 Utah495, 260P.2d539 (1953).
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Consequently, there is no merit to appellant's position on
the sufficiency of corroborative evidence.
POINT IV.

THERE W:\S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY
TO C:ONVlCT THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF AS"·\l rr.T \\'lTII INTENT TO COMMIT MURDER.

The appellant contends that the evidence before the jury
was insufficient to convict him of the crime of assault with
intent to commit murder. The basis of the appellant's contention is that there is no evidence sufficient to show his
intent. It is a generally recognized rule of law that intent
may be presumed from the natural and probable consequences of one's acts. Dunlap v. United States, 70 F.2d 35
(7th Circuit 1934); Perkins, Criminal Law ( 1958), p. 659.
In State v. Minousis, 64 Utah 206, 228 Pac. 574 ( 1924),
the appellant was convicted of the crime of assault with
intent to commit murder. The facts and circumstances are
substantively similar to those in the instant case in that
there \\·as no direct evidence of the appellant's intent. In
affirming the conviction, this court stated:
"It is equally well settled that such specific intent may be proved by
circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence, and that it may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the accused, the nature of
the weapon used by defendant and manner in which it was used,
taken together with all the other circumstances in the case. 2
Bishop, New Grim. Proc. § 1101; 3 Bishop, New Grim. Proc. § 661;
~Iichie on Homicide, p. 1343, § 257; Abb. Trial Brief Grim. Cas.
677, 678; Lovett v. State, 9 Ga. App. 232, 70 S.E. 989; State v.
Ruck, 19-t ~Io. 416,92 S.W. 706,5 Ann. Cas. 976; People v. Scott,
6 .Mich. 287; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S.W. 889, 26 Am.
St. Rep. -t-t; People v. Owens, 3 Cal. App. 750, 86 Pac. 980; State
, .. ~!ills, 6 Pennewill, 497, 69 Atl. 841; Crosby v. People, 137 Ill.
325, 27 :\'.E. 49; People v. Landman, 103 Cal. 577, 37 Pac. 518 .
.. In discussing the question of intent in a case somewhat similar to
the one at bar, that eminent jurist, Mr. Justice Campbell, of the
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Supreme Court of Michigan, in the course of his opinion in People
v. Scott, supra, said:
'The intent to kill must undoubtedly be established, as an inference of fact, to the satisfaction of the jury; but they may draw
that inference, as they draw all other inferences, from any fact in
evidence which, to their minds fairly proves its existence. Intentions can only be proved by acts, as juries cannot look into the
breast of the criminal.' "

An examination of the facts in this case overwhelmingly
demonstrate that there was ample evidence upon which a
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the intent to commit murder. First, the appellant
entered the store of Mr. Eldon Brady armed with a loaded
shotgun. Secondly, he admitted firing the shotgun in an
effort to accomplish his robbery. Third, immediately after
leaving the store he indicated that the money he had obtained wasn't much to "shoot an old man for." Further, in
his statements to Johnnie Buck, he stated he just shot "the
old son-of-a-bitch and I think I killed him" (R. 64). All of
this evidence, coupled with the nature of the shooting, the
fact that it was committed deliberately and intentionally in
an effort to coerce the victim into relinquishing his property, and that the appellant was of the opinion that he had
killed his victim, is clearly sufficient evidence upon which
the jury could infer that the appellant intended to murder
Mr. Brady.
The evidence before the jury raised a factual issue which
they resolved adverse to the appellant. There is no basis to
claim error on appeal.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RECEIVE EVIDENCE IMPEACHING THE CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED IN THE
ABSENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAVING PLACED HIS CHARACTER IN ISSUE.
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In his final point, the appellant piteously argues that the
trial court committed error by allowing testimony adverse
to the defendant's character to be received in evidence prior
to the time the appellant had placed his character in issue.
Once again the appellant bases his argument upon the admission of the testimony of Johnnie Buck and, consequently,
the point, as can be seen from what has been said before, is
without merit.
As an aside to the issue, the appellant contends that the
argument of the prosecutor to the effect that the appellant
had shown no compassion or regret for his offense attacked
his character. It should be noted that no objection was
made to the argument, and that the argument was merely
fair comment upon the evidence as it was placed before the
jury. There is no merit to the position of the appellant.

CONCLUSION
In State v. Kazda, supra, this court reversed the conviction of the appellant for an error not involved in the instant
appeal. The issues raised in this appeal are in no way related to those which warranted reversal in the previous case.
The evidence overwhelmingly and conclusively proved the
appellant's guilt, and the record of proceedings discloses
that there was no error of any kind committed.
The appellant has been given more than his day in court,
and has been justly convicted. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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